Pseudo-precision? Precise forecasts and impression management in managerial earnings forecasts by Hayward, MLA & Fitza, MA
r Academy of Management Journal
2017, Vol. 60, No. 3, 1094–1116.
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2014.0304
PSEUDO-PRECISION? PRECISE FORECASTS AND
IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT IN
MANAGERIAL EARNINGS FORECASTS
MATHEW L. A. HAYWARD
Monash University
MARKUS A. FITZA
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and the University of Newcastle
We examine earnings guidance precision as a mechanism of organization impression
management (OIM) and, specifically, suggest that strategic leaders use more precise
earnings forecasts as an OIM tactic to convey a greater sense of authority and control
over organizational performance after material organizational setbacks. Contributing to
the OIM literature, we argue that the use of more precise judgmentmakes use of different
psychological mechanisms compared to kinds of OIM that have been previously stud-
ied. The results presented here suggest that (a) OIM is an important motivation for more
precise earnings forecasts, (b) precision as an OIM tactic is more likely to arise when
managers convey impressions of brighter performance prospects, and (c) investors
generally respond favorably to the tactic.
Forecasts of organizational performance are used
by managers to shape impressions of capital budget-
ing decisions, sales projections, earnings per share
(EPS), and so forth, and each of these forecasts is
subject to varying levels of precision (Raju & Roy,
2000). This is reflected in statements such as, “We
are 90% confident that acquiring XYZwill generate
material net present value” or “Contingent on XYZ,
sales will be 5–10% higher this fiscal year.” To be
more precise is to express amatter more exactly (for
example, forecasting earnings to be between 5 and 15
cents per share is less exact and less precise than
forecasting them to be between 9 and 11 cents), and
more exact or precise forecasts are more informative.
For instance, a CEO or CFOwho states that EPSwill
be $1.10 is generally perceived as being more in-
formative and authoritative than one stating that it
will be between $.90 and $1.30.
Yet, there is a trade-off betweenbeingmoreprecise
and being more accurate, wherein forecast accuracy
refers to whether the forecast is realized, ex post.
Judgmentwith ahigh level of precision ismore likely
to bewrong since it leaves less room for error and the
resultant errors can potentially diminish managerial
credibility and reputation. Yet, in spite of such po-
tentially negative consequences, evidence has sug-
gested that leaders tend to be highly precise relative
to the uncertainty surrounding forecasts, particu-
larly in the domain of earnings guidance, where
firms meet their “annual earnings guidance
[i.e., earnings per share projected by firm leaders]
only approximately six percent of the time” (Hirst,
Koonce, & Venkataraman, 2008: 326; see also Haran,
Moore, & Morewedge, 2010). Such an empirical
regularity poses intriguing questions about top
managers’motivations, considering that leaders can
forecast sufficiently wide ranges of prospective out-
comes so as to virtually assure accuracy (Sutton &
Staw, 1995).1 Thus, explaining and predicting the
motivations for a given level of precision in forecasts
would allow scholars and practitioners to better
interpret precision in managerial judgments. Why
would top managers issue very precise judgments,
particularly in the crucial domain of earnings fore-
casts or guidance of next year’s earnings, given that
such precise judgment potentially induces errors
and erodes their credibility?
In this paper, we contribute to the understanding
of organizational impression management (OIM) by
examining forecast precision as a previously under-
studied form of OIM. While past OIM literature has
focused mostly on qualitative attempts to sway the
impression of firm stakeholders, we argue that pre-
cision is an example of a quantitative OIM tactic—a
1 We define accuracy as whether a forecast matches the
actual result. A forecast is accurate if it comes true. We
define precision as the spread with which a forecast is
given.
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tactic that uses different cognitive mechanisms than
more overt OIM interventions (Elsbach, 2003). The
thesis explored here is that regardless of whether
managers are mindful of the drawbacks of such
errors, their motivation to regain favorable impres-
sions after organizational setbacks through issuing
very precise forecasts is instrumental. That is, issu-
ing precise forecasts is anOIM tactic or an action that
is carried out to influence stakeholders’ perceptions
of the organization and its leaders (Bolino, Kacmar,
Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008; Graffin, Carpenter, &
Boivie, 2011; Graffin, Haleblian & Kiley, 2015). To
test this thesis, we select conditions that have been
robustly found by OIM scholars to implicate OIM,
and use these conditions to evaluate whether pre-
cision is an OIM tactic that conveys a sense of man-
agerial control aftermaterial organizational setbacks,
along with whether this tactic is effective.2 We sug-
gest that after events that contribute to negative im-
pressions of their firms’ managers use more precise
forecasts to create the perception that they have
control and authority over their organizations and
their performance (Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer,
1983).3
We impose governing conditions of organizational
setbacks not just to better explain and predict fore-
cast precision, but also to contribute to the OIM
literature, as leaders are particularly motivated to
regain perceptions of authority and control after they
have violated stakeholders’ expectations, including
by missing previous earnings expectations, under-
performing relative to industry peers, and following
value-destroying strategies, suchaspoorlyperceived
acquisitions (Graffin et al., 2015).
As we suggest below, forecasts using high levels of
precision can not only be persuasive relative to the
focal forecast, but can also allow those who issue
them to be perceived by target audiences as more
authoritative and in control. Whereas persuasion
refers to the use of reason and logic to convince
others about a focal action or representation
(Westphal & Bednar, 2008), OIM refers to attempts to
gain or regain favorable impressions of organizations
and their leaders (Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Tetlock &
Manstead, 1985). We propose that when leaders
make more precise representations about their or-
ganizations they convey control and authority and
thus create favorable impressions about themselves
and their organizations. Thus, we argue that being
more precise is not only more persuasive, but can
also serve OIM purposes.
The voluminous OIM literature has substantially
advanced our understanding of the antecedents,
characteristics, and consequences of OIM, and in
this article we seek to further explain and predict
the precision with which representations are made
to investors. Elsbach (2003) categorizedOIM tactics
as involving verbal accounts, categorizations, la-
bels, symbolic behavior and physical markers, each
of which is undertaken with different intentions
(see also Bolino et al., 2008; Gardner and Martinko,
1998). In light of psychology evidence that more
precise judges are perceived as being more author-
itative and perceive themselves to be more author-
itative, we introduce judgment precision as a form
of OIM for affecting the impressions of investors
and other stakeholders who interpret and evaluate
firm performance and leadership (Jerez-Fernandez,
Angulo, & Oppenheimer, 2014; Mason, Lee, Wiley,
& Ames, 2013; Thomas, Simon, & Kidiyali, 2011).
However, we argue that as an OIM tactic, precision
differs from other previously studied impression
management tactics as it involves invoking numeri-
cal cues, rather than qualitative signals, that are
processed more automatically or subconsciously.
This is important in light of evidence that verbal and
written accounts expressed in conference calls and
annual reports can be counterproductive in sway-
ing the quantitative mindsets and analyses of se-
curity analysts and investors (Hobson, Mayew, &
Venkatachalam, 2012; Larcker and Zakolyukina,
2012). Potentially, leaders can offset or bypass such
skepticism toward seemingly self-serving accounts,
including self-serving attributions, by framing out-
comes more precisely, and this could be especially
instrumental after leadership and organizational
impressions have been damaged (Kahneman, 2011;
Staw et al., 1983).
In summary, the central research questions for this
article are: How do OIM considerations explain the
level of precision in managers’ forecasts? and What
are the effects of such precision? By examining these
questions,we seek to contribute to theOIM literature
by introducing a previously understudiedmethod of
OIM that relies on different psychological mecha-
nisms than the OIM tactics studied in the past, as we
shall elaborate. In the next section, we situate core
2 These selected conditions also allow us to control for
the prospect that managers are more precise because they
are more confident. This is because after encountering
such setbacks managers would—holding other factors
constant—be less confident about making more precise
predictions (Moore & Healy, 2008).
3 Within the earnings guidance context, precision refers
to the range within which guidance is issued.
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explanations of judgment precision within the un-
derlying psychology literature.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Explanations of Judgment Precision
Interrelated theories have been advanced to ex-
plain the level of precisionused in forecasts. The first
concerns forecast predictability, wherein greater
ability to accurately predict the future fosters more
precise forecasts. Put differently, the more predict-
able the earnings, themore precise topmanagerswill
be in forecasting earnings. However, while impor-
tant, this perspective does not account for the wide-
spread errors in forecast precision described above
(Makridakis, Hogarth, & Gaba, 2009; Yaniv & Foster,
1995, 1997).
A related principal explanation that to some de-
gree addresses this issue is confidence, wherein
more confident people issue more precise forecasts
(Moore & Healy, 2008). While this explanation of
forecast precision has not been systematically ap-
plied to managerial and organizational settings,
there is evidence that lab subjects provide narrow
or precise confidence intervals if they feel more
confident (Alpert & Raiffa, 1982; Klayman, Soll,
Gonzalez-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; Soll & Klayman,
2004). Put differently, the observed error in earn-
ings forecasts (i.e., the gap between actual earnings
and earnings forecasts) could be a function of
managerial overconfidence. We seek to control for
this dynamic by (a) choosing organizational condi-
tions that implicate our core theoretical mechanism
(OIM) but not the confidence explanation, and (b)
controlling for predictors of managerial confidence
(Moore &Healy, 2008). Regarding the first point, we
refer to evidence that managerial confidence is di-
minished or mediated after major organizational
setbacks (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Hribar &
Yang, 2015; Li & Tang, 2010; Malmendier & Tate,
2005) and then test the OIM perspective in the
context of such setbacks.
A third principal explanation of higher forecast
precision is managerial persuasion, wherein man-
agers seek to use reason and logic to convince others
about a focal action or representation (Westphal &
Bednar, 2008). In this vein, there is a perception that
precision and accuracy are positively correlated,
even if this perception is flawed. This explanation
also helps to explain errors associated with
precision—in a bid to bemorepersuasive in the short
term, top managers may seek to accept and manage
longer-term consequences. For instance, in a large
survey of CFOs, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopol
(2005) found that managers routinely forsake value-
creating projects in order to avoid short-term in-
vestment costs that lower share prices and CEO
compensation. Likewise, managers extensively use
questionable accounting techniques, including
earnings manipulation, to bolster short-term earn-
ings even if this can—in the long term—result in
accounting restatements and investor-led litigation
(e.g., DeChow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996).
In addition to these explanations, we introduce
the impression management (in our case OIM)
hypothesis, which has not been directly tested in
the psychology and organizational literature as
an explanation of judgment precision. Whereas
persuasion pertains to the focal representation
(e.g., persuading an audience that the earnings
forecast is going to come true) (Brass & Burkhardt,
1993: 447; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988;Westphal, 1998;
Westphal & Bednar, 2008: 29; Yukl & Tracey, 1992),
impression management is designed to create fa-
vorable perceptions about the organizations and its
leaders. According to psychologists, impression
management refers to strategies used to create
“desired social images” (Tetlock &Manstead, 1985:
59; see also Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker,
1980). OIM tactics are invoked after, and condi-
tioned upon, material organizational and mana-
gerial setbacks, and are intended to convey global
positive impressions (e.g.,Westphal, Park,McDonald,
& Hayward, 2012) including that organizational
leaders areauthoritativeand incontrol.Thus,whereas
persuasion is effective when it results in accep-
tance of the focal representation, impression
management is intended to create favorable impres-
sions and legitimacy around a series of organiza-
tional actions. This is particularly important when
legitimacy has been badly damaged by adverse de-
velopments that undermine managerial credibility,
especially missing earnings expectations (Cialdini,
2006; Staw et al., 1983). Accordingly, we seek to
examine the use of precision over and above those
relating to persuasion by governing results on con-
ditions found by OIM scholars to implicate OIM.
Such conditions can be events that have caused
stakeholders to develop negative impressions of the
firm, especially those that managers are responsible
for and that point to a lack ofmanagerial control over
key firm outcomes.We argue that this perceived lack
of understanding and control can be countered by
the use of more precise guidance through core
mechanisms.
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First, psychology studies have shown that precise
guidance strengthens forecasters’ sense that they
control prospective outcomes, relative tomore vague
and ambiguous representations that reflect and
manifest uncertainty (Erev, Wallsten, & Neal, 1991).
That is, whether themore precise forecast is justified
or not, judges perceive that they have more control
over outcomes by being more precise about them,
a conviction that in turn affects investors and other
stakeholders (Weick, 1979). Welsh, Navarro, and
Begg (2011) showed, for example, that judges who
usemoreprecise representations (in termsof number
of decimal places by which an outcome is repre-
sented) perceive themselves to be more confident
andauthoritative in general (i.e., not justwith respect
to the outcome that they project). Itwould follow that
the act of issuing more precise earnings guidance
will help convince leaders they have greater control
over firm performance, and this would be more sa-
lient after material organizational setbacks. Teigen
(1990) also showed that actors generally have a bias
toward beingmore precise, even if thismight comeat
the cost of being incorrect. Overall precision enables
actors to gain or regain a sense of control over their
environment, as a fundamental human motivation
that surfaces in managerial interactions with stake-
holders (Heider, 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Staw
et al., 1983).
Second, precision not only affects one’s self-
image; audiences also perceive that more precise
judges have greater control over the outcomes for
which they are responsible (Yaniv & Foster, 1995).
They may also infer that people who use more pre-
cision have a better understanding of the factors that
influence the outcome. Studies of negotiations, for
instance, have shown that negotiators who issue
more precise offers are perceived as better informed,
and even better negotiators, in a manner that tran-
scends a focal offer or negotiation (Mason et al.,
2013). By contrast, actors, and especially leaders,
who represent outcomes vaguely and ambiguously
are perceived as lacking control, a result that looms
as problematic to leaders who have lost credibility
after organizational setbacks (Haran et al., 2010; Soll
& Klayman, 2004). Janiszewski and Uy (2008) found
that the influence of an initial offer in a negotiation is
stronger when the initial offer is precise, in part be-
cause others perceive that a more precise judge is
more authoritative and better informed. Likewise,
patients find doctors who issue more precise pro-
jections about treatment outcomes (e.g., 95% likeli-
hood of success versus highly likely to succeed) to be
more competent and authoritative, and this in turn
increases the likelihood that patients will accept
doctors’ procedures without checking base rates of
failure or seeking a second opinion (Brun & Teigen,
1988; Michie et al., 2005). Leaders who sense this
property of being precise are thus likely to issue
more precise forecasts about organizational perfor-
mance after they have lost credibility and authority
(Salancik & Meindl, 1984).
The mechanisms described above suggest that
precision operates as an OIM tactic—that it fosters
the impression that the issuer of a forecast (e.g., a
CEO or a firm) is authoritative and in control. While
establishing such positive impressions is the ex-
pressed goal of OIM, we argue that precision as an
OIM tactic differs from previously examined OIM
mechanisms.
Psychological Processing of Precision differs from
other Commonly Studied Forms of OIM
The psychologicalmechanism bywhich precision
operates on audiences differs in form and function
from cognitive adjustments that underpin other
kinds of OIM tactics, including those that involve
defensive, obfuscating and justifying accounts. Of-
ten, these latter tactics require significant cognitive
processing by target audiences because they can
confront and challenge preexisting beliefs and thus
invoke cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962).
Elsbach and Sutton (1992) found, for instance, that
some organizations attain legitimacy through ille-
gitimate actions. Cognitively, this requires that
audiences assess whether the actions (e.g., the
disruption of a church service or spikes left in trees
that could injure lumber workers) are legitimate or
illegitimate, and, if the latter, whether they are also
acceptable and appropriate. Elsbach and Kramer
(1996) showed that business school deans were
cognitively distressed by what they perceived as in-
appropriate Business Week categorizations of their
schools and thus issued statements to correct those
categorizations. To ensure their statements were
acted upon rather than ignored, the deans required
that constituents assessed the schools’ impression
relative to that conveyed by Business Week (see also
Pratt & Foreman, 2000).
Kahneman (2011) concluded that humans adopt
two modes of thinking: Whereas Type 1 thinking
involves fast, intuitive, unconscious thought, Type 2
thinking is predicated on slow, calculating, con-
scious thought. As the above examples suggest, OIM
tactics often involve Type 2 cognitive processes that
are conscious, effortful, and analytical (Kahneman,
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2011). Bycontrast, precisionhasbeen found to invoke
Type 1 processes or those that are subconscious, au-
tomatic and effortless (Jerez-Fernandez et al., 2014;
Mason et al., 2013; Thomas et al., 2011).
Type 1 processes account for how greater pre-
cision conveys greater authority and control
(e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Yaniv & Foster, 1995). In this
vein, the time required to evaluate and recall
numerical changes is positively related to wider
numerical separation (e.g., a point estimate is as-
similated more rapidly than a range, and narrower
ranges are processed more rapidly than wider
ranges) (Aiken &Williams, 1973;Moyer & Landauer,
1967; Parkman, 1971).4 From a practical standpoint,
more precise guidance may be more readily in-
corporated into analysts’ and investors’ valuation
spreadsheets compared to qualitative representa-
tions. When a CFO projects next year’s guidance to
be, say, $10.23 per share, that number can be directly
inserted into analytical instruments and formulae,
including those contained in spreadsheets. By con-
trast, an entreaty such as “Fiscal year results were
caused by unexpected cost overruns that have been
corrected with new divisional leadership” requires
greater sensemaking, including why the overruns
occurred and how they could have been avoided
(Weick, 1979).
Leaders assume greater authority and control by
invoking in followers and audiences Type 1 cogni-
tive processes that involve less questioning, re-
sistance, and skepticism toward them (Bargh &
Chartrand, 1999). This may be especially instru-
mental in defusing skepticism of professional
investors and analysts who have been disappointed
by lower-than-expected earnings and questionable
strategic initiatives (Hobson, 2012; Westphal et al.,
2012).5 For instance, in their study of the content
of CEO and CFO conference calls with analysts,
Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012: 495) found that
CEOs were perceived by professional investors to
routinely use hyperbole and deceptive language in
explaining performance and strategies in confer-
ence calls with analysts, and that this can in turn
arouse investor skepticism and cynicism toward
those CEOs.
While precision has been shown to have these
physiological effects, it has not been established that
individuals or organizations intentionally use pre-
cision to this end. However, taken together, these
effects offer rationale for why precision may be
a ubiquitous and perhaps effective means by which
top managers try to create the impression that they
understandwhat drives their firm’s performance and
are in a position to exercise control and authority
over their firm’s prospects. Building upon the OIM
literature, a starting point for testing this proposition
is to develop conditions under which top managers
would seek to restore favorable OIM or to regain
impressions that they are in control (Elsbach, 2003).
Before elaborating further, however, it is important
to provide additional background regarding the focal
context undergirding this study—that is, earnings
guidance precision.
Brief Literature Review of the Earnings Guidance
Precision Quandary
Corporate earnings are influenced by many exog-
enous and uncontrollable factors, ranging from
fashions and consumer tastes to the weather, and
from changing political winds to the relative health
of the broader economy. There is even uncertainty
about how to account for earnings numbers because
they are socially constructedor subject to changeable
accounting conventions (Carruthers, & Espeland,
1991; Hines, 1989). Nevertheless, executives rou-
tinely exercise the discretion to issue precise quan-
titative forecasts of future earnings (i.e., earnings
guidance). The accounting literature on such guid-
ance has examined (a) antecedents of firms’ decision
to issue earnings guidance, (b) factors that explain
the characteristics of such guidance and (c) impli-
cations of earnings guidance (Hirst et al., 2008). Ex-
planations for these first twoquestions revolvearound
institutional considerations, information asymmetry,
and uncertainty in the underlying information envi-
ronment (Healy & Palepu, 2001).
To elaborate, legal and regulatory changes have
shaped what can and must be disclosed, and to
whom, although these changes have slowed recently
and pertain to guidance and forecasts in general,
rather than forecast precision in particular. Earnings
guidance has also been extensively studied with
4 In the marketing literature, Thomas et al. (2011) found
that buyers aremore likely to accept offers that appear to be
more precise even if they are more expensive because the
appearance of greater precision conveys authority and
eases cognitive processing (e.g., $395,425was perceived to
be smaller than $395,000).
5 Westphal et al. (2012) built upon such insight by
underscoring that such persuasion attempts are less ef-
fective when they are perceived to be more self-serving.
Therefore, CEOs in their sample worked to elicit and gain
impression management support from peers who fur-
nished the OIM intervention with journalists.
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respect to the perceived asymmetry of information
held by the firm relative to that which is publicly
available. In general, more extensive and detailed
earnings guidance is assumed to be desirable be-
cause it reduces stock price volatility and lowers
firms’ cost of capital (e.g., Leuz & Verrechia, 2000).
Related to this is the “uncertainty or accuracy” the-
sis, wherein managers issue more precise guidance
to reflect more predictable earnings. Factors thought
to increase earnings certainty, such as superior cor-
porate governance, greater analyst following, or sta-
ble industry conditions, tend to increase earnings
guidance precision (Ajinkya & Gift, 1984; Baginski &
Hassell, 1997).
A limitation of the above accounting perspectives,
however, particularly as they pertain to the un-
certainty or accuracy thesis, is that they fail to ac-
count for errors in forecast precision as discussed
earlier. In light of the broader organizational drivers
of guidance precision, we now consider when stra-
tegic leaders would seek to be more authoritative
about their firms’ performance prospects by being
more precise about them. A starting point is the in-
sight from OIM theory that impression tactics are
invoked in thewake of negative triggers that threaten
the reputation of top managers and their organiza-
tions (Bolino et al., 2008).Asdiscussedabove,OIM is
concerned with fashioning and restoring favorable
impressions, especially after they have been dam-
aged, and missing earnings expectations is excep-
tionally damaging to managerial and organizational
credibility. The follow section addresses and out-
lines conditions that implicateOIM, startingwith the
event of an earnings miss.
Organizational Setbacks and Earnings
Guidance Precision
A robust result in the OIM literature is that leaders
of organizations work to foster positive impressions
after performance has not met expectations, in-
cluding before, during, and after releasing a negative
earnings surprise or “earnings miss”—the extent to
which actual earnings fall short of the forecast
(e.g., Westphal & Deephouse, 2011; Westphal et al.,
2012). One study found that CEOs undertake exten-
sive and calculated interactions with counterparts
aheadof earningsmisses so as tomitigate subsequent
loss of journalist and investor support (Westphal
et al., 2012). This result arises in part because earn-
ings misses can adversely impact firms’ share price
and CEOs’ compensation and tenure (Denis & Kruse,
2000; Matsumoto, 2002; Matsunaga & Park, 2001).
Earningsmisses create negative impressions about
CEOs by highlighting that they failed to realize
forecasts, and lack control over and appreciation of
the drivers of firm performance or the authority,
control, and competence to realize outcomes. CEOs
who seek to regain more favorable impressions, es-
pecially those of authority and control, after missing
prior earnings expectations are thus likely to issue
more precise and authoritative earnings forecasts.
An important counterpoint, however, is that man-
agers would seek to be less precise following an
earnings miss so as to increase the likelihood of
making accurate forecasts. In this reasoning, man-
agers would be adverse to further disappointing
stakeholders, including investors, by issuing an
overly precise forecast of higher earnings, especially
considering the additional scrutiny after an earnings
miss. An OIM perspective, however, predicts the
opposite—that the motivation to create the percep-
tion of being in control is stronger after setbacks.
Thus:
Hypothesis 1a. After an earnings miss, earn-
ings guidance will be expressed with higher
precision.
Note that the above arguments are not qualified by
the direction of the guidance—that is, whether the
forecast represents a rise or fall in earnings relative to
previous forecasts. Above, we suggest that in either
case precision will strengthen the impression that
leaders understand and control performance out-
comes. In the following, we argue that forecasts of
improved performance strengthen leaders’ motiva-
tion to be more precise. That is, consistent with an
OIM perspective of forecast precision, the relation-
ship expressed in Hypothesis 1a would strengthen
for higher earnings guidance. Holding other factors
constant, after amaterial setback such as an earnings
miss, stakeholders would tend to be more resistant
and skeptical toward outcomes that are more in-
congruent with the beliefs shaped by the disap-
pointingevent—so that apredictionofhigher earnings
attracts greater cognitivedissonance (Festinger, 1962).
In addition, projecting a rosier picture after setbacks
is more likely to be perceived as managerially self-
serving, invoking further skepticism. Put differently,
being more precise in issuing higher guidance would
tend to defuse investor questioning, resistance and
skepticism toward the higher guidance (Bargh &
Chartrand, 1999).
We therefore predict that when forecasting earn-
ings increases after setbacks, managers are even
more motivated to use precision to overcome
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skepticism by stakeholders—precision can help to
replace the perception that managers are acting in
a self-servingmanner by the impression that they are
in control and authoritative in their predictions.
Thus:
Hypothesis 1b. The positive relationship be-
tween a preceding earnings miss and the pre-
cision of subsequent earnings guidance will
strengthen when that guidance represents an
earnings increase.
Another central condition of OIM arises when
firms report below-industry-averageperformance. In
these cases, investors could have generated superior
returns by investing in competitor companies in the
same industry. Studies of the institutional bases of
strategy have shown that analysts and other pro-
fessionals develop normative expectations of firms
within industries, and that strategic leaders closely
track the performance of industry peers (Oliver,
1991; Westphal & Deephouse, 2011). When firms
underperform according to industry expectations,
their price–earnings (PE) ratio declines, limiting
their prospects to raise capital on favorable terms and
increasing the likelihood that their firms will be
subject to takeovers (Baum & Oliver, 1996; Porac,
Wade, & Pollock, 1999).
However, below-industry-average performance
also points to the need for reforms required for orga-
nizational competitiveness (Quinn, 1978).Under these
circumstances, leaders would benefit from stake-
holders’ impressions or perceptions that leaders un-
derstand what drives firm and industry performance,
and that they have the authority and control to execute
necessary change. Thus, an OIM perspective would
predict that firms in this situation would formulate
more precise earnings projections in order to create
such impressions (Elsbach, 2006; Elsbach, Sutton, &
Principe, 1998). Thus:
Hypothesis 2a. After a period of below-industry-
average performance, earnings guidance will be
expressed with higher precision.
And extending Hypothesis 1b, we also suggest
that:
Hypothesis2b.Thepositive relationshipbetween
a preceding period of below-industry-average
performance and the precision of subsequent
earnings guidance will strengthen when that
guidance represents an earnings increase.
CEOs can also greatly disappoint stakeholders and
create the impression that they lack understanding
and control after questionable mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&As) (Graffin, Haleblian, & Kiley, 2015;
Martin & McConnell, 1991). Organizational evi-
dence has suggested that leaders closely monitor the
market reaction toM&A announcements and engage
in impression management to counter adverse
sentiment (see Haleblian, Devers, McNamara,
Carpenter, & Davison, 2009, for a review). For
instance, Graffin et al. (2015) found that leaders
undertake “offsetting impression management”
wherein they announce good news contemporane-
ously with M&A announcements in a manner that
can offset adverse reactions to these M&As. The
scope for poorly perceived acquisitions to damage
CEOs’ credibility is reinforced by evidence that such
acquisitions increase the likelihood of CEO dis-
missal and can trigger investor disagreement with
leaders’ strategies (Lehn & Zhao, 2006). In other
words, such events raise questions about how well
CEOs understand and can direct firm strategy and
performance.
Thus, it would seem that managers who experi-
enced a negative reaction to a major strategic initia-
tive such as an M&A have reason to strengthen their
own and their organization’s credibility, and elicit
stakeholders’ impressions that strategies reflect un-
derstanding of and control over the drivers of per-
formance. Thus, as argued above, leaders will issue
more precise earnings forecasts, as follows:
Hypothesis 3a. After a negative market reaction
to an M&A announcement, earnings guidance
will be expressed with higher precision.
Furthermore, in keeping with Hypotheses 1a and
2b above, we also suggest the following:
Hypothesis 3b. The positive relationship be-
tween a preceding negative market reaction to
an M&A announcement and the precision of
subsequent earnings guidance will strengthen
when that guidance represents an earnings
increase.
Above, we drew from the OIM literature to elabo-
rate upon adverse organizational developments that
motivate strategic leaders to engage in OIM via more
precise higher earnings guidance. While this is not
a comprehensive and exhaustive set of such de-
velopments, the onset and enactment of these dy-
namics reflect important financial, institutional, and
strategic considerations that implicate OIM.
Having examined OIM motivations for earnings
guidance precision, we now examine the efficacy of
such interventions.
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Does Earnings Guidance Precision Result in More
Favorable Organizational Impressions?
Above, we proposed that more precise guidance
fosters impressions that topmanagers are in control
of organizational performance. More precise guid-
ance may also generate positive impressions be-
cause it conveys more authoritative outcomes that
stakeholders can make organizational leaders ac-
countable for. Carefully expressed data about orga-
nizational performance, exemplified in this case by
narrow (precise) estimates, leaves less doubt in
stakeholders’ minds about forecasters’ competence
and control (Cialdini, 2006; Motowidlo, Dunnette,
& Carter, 1990). Overall, it would seem that greater
earnings guidance precision represents a subtle
means to convey more favorable organizational im-
pressions to quantitatively oriented stakeholders, es-
pecially investors. If this proposition were valid, we
wouldexpect that investorswould respondpositively
to such guidance.
Moreover, more precise guidance offers a more
concrete basis for leaders to be accountable to
stakeholders relative to imprecise and vague guid-
ance. In this vein, there is evidence that leaders who
convey the willingness to be held accountable are
perceived to have greater control over their organi-
zations (Westphal, 2010). Tetlock (1985) described
accountability as the nature and level of pressure
upon individuals to justify choices and judgment; in
this sense, precision confers the specificity of top
managerial accountability.
There is some evidence that investors react nega-
tively to signs that organizational leaders lack con-
trol and understanding (e.g., Staw et al., 1983;
Villalonga &Amit, 2006;Westphal & Zajac, 1998). In
an OIM framework, however, more precise forecasts
would foster impressions that managers are in con-
trol and understand the drivers of firm performance,
and that CEOs are prepared to provide tighter pa-
rameters that they are accountable for. Thus, we ex-
pect that investors would respond positively tomore
precise forecasts. Thus:
Hypothesis 4. The precision with which earn-
ings guidance is expressed will be positively
related to the stock market’s reaction to the
announcement of the guidance.
We posit this effect independently of whether the
guidance purveys higher or lower earnings. That is,
we suggest that precision conveys positive impres-
sions about a firm’s management and that this im-
pression in itself should have a positive effect on the
share price that is in addition (over and above) the
reaction to the direction of the forecast. In other
words, holding the positivity or negativity of the
forecast constant (i.e., by controlling for it) investors
would respond positively to more precise guidance.
Having developed hypotheses to test the two core
propositions elaborated above, we now turn to the
data and methodology to analyze such hypotheses.
DATA AND METHODS
We used the First Call database from Thomson
Reuters as a source of annual company earnings
guidance covering fiscal years 2005 through 2011.
This database is commonly used in the accounting
literature, where it was established that the First Call
data are a representative subsample of Compustat
firms (Anilowski, Feng, & Skinner, 2007; Hirst,
Koonce, & Venkataraman, 2007). We chose the years
2005 to 20116 as the timeframe for our analysis be-
cause First Call data are more reliable for more re-
cent years (Glushkov, 2007).
TheFirst Call database contains earnings guidance
for publicly traded U.S. firms. Quantitative earnings
guidance is measured as EPS and expressed in three
major forms: (a) as a range, (b) as apoint estimate, and
(c) with an upper or lower bound (e.g., “above 15
cents”). A total of 10% of the guidance in our sample
are points, 89% are ranges, and 1% involves a lower
bound and 0.3% an upper bound (e.g., notmore than
10 cents). Point estimates represent amaximumlevel
of precision, but the third category of guidance is
more difficult to interpret in terms of earnings pre-
cision. On the one hand, one could argue that these
observations represent highly imprecise forms of
guidance. On the other, we lack a basis on which to
establish the level of imprecision relative to range
forecasts, and thus we excluded all forecasts in the
third category.
Another issue is that many companies frequently
revise their guidance, leading them to issue earnings
guidance more than once per fiscal year. This makes
it necessary to delineate a single common point
of comparison across the population of firms to
avoid oversampling on firms that frequently update
guidance.
To address this issue,weused the annual guidance
(annual guidance is the most common form of guid-
ance) provided by a company for a given year that
was issued at least one month before the end of the
6 2011 is our end point because it was when First Call
was discontinued by Thomson Financial.
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fiscal year.7 Thus, the measured guidance precision
is not simply a function of firms approaching the end
of a given fiscal year. As a robustness check, we
tested the impact of setting the cutoff at different
points in time and found that the effects are statisti-
cally indistinguishable, as we describe later in our
discussion of themodel’s sensitivity. For hypotheses
testing, the First Call database was augmented with
annual accounting data from Compustat, data about
CEO compensation from Compustat Executive, and
share price data from the Center for Research in Se-
curity Prices (CRSP). For the timeframe covered by
our dataset, the First Call database contains 3,901
companies that issued point or range estimates for
2,918of these firms’data available onCompustat and
CRSP. However, not all companies issue guidance in
all years and some in our study issued them later
thanour observationwindow (30days before the end
of the fiscal year). Thus, our dataset contains 7,092
company–year combinations for which guidance
was issued more than 30 days before the end of the
fiscal year (see above) and for which Compustat and
CRSP data are available. However, to test our hy-
potheses and to calculate some of our control vari-
ables, we require that each firm had released an
estimate in the prior year. These requirements re-
duced the sample used to test our hypotheses to
4,728 observations.
Empirical Approach
We investigated firms’ use of earnings guidance
precision as a method of managing impressions, but
not all firms issue such guidance each year. This
represents a selection bias—we can only analyze the
antecedents, aswell as the consequences, of earnings
guidance precision for firms that issue guidance.
Hence, we employ a two-step Heckman model,
wherein the first step uses a Probit procedure to es-
timate the probability of a firm issuing a guidance
range in a given year (Heckman, 1979; Winship &
Mare, 1992). The second model is an ordinary least
square (OLS) procedure that controls for the selec-
tion effect estimated in the first equation. Thedataset
comprises a time series covering seven years of ob-
servations, with multiple observations for each firm.
This allows us to take into account that different
firms might face different systematic uncertainty
(uncertainty that does not change over time) ormight
prefer certain levels of guidance precision. Because
of this time series structure of our dataset, we esti-
mated our regression models with clustered errors
(e.g., Andrews, 1991; Rogers, 1993; Thompson,
2011; Petersen, 2009; Williams, 2000; Wooldridge,
2010) along two dimensions, the first based on the
guidance-issuing firm and the second based on the
year the guidance is given, taking into account that
the overall level of guidance precision might differ
from year to year.8 To facilitate interpretation of the
results, we standardize each continuous variable to
z-scores with each variable’s mean and standard
deviation.
We test Hypotheses 1a to 3b with the following
equation:
Preci 5b0 1b1EMi 1b2BIPi 1b3NMAi 1 gCV 1 «i
(1)
where Preci is the precision with which earnings
guidance i is announced,EM captureswhether a firm
missed its earnings guidance in the last fiscal year,
BIP captures whether the a firm’s market perfor-
mance was below the industry average in the quarter
leading up to the earnings guidance, NMA captures
whether there was a negative stock market reaction
to an M&A announcement in the quarter leading up
to the earnings guidance, andCV is avector of control
variables that contain the inverseMills ratio from the
first step of the Heckman procedure, as well as
the other control variables, as described below.
Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a imply that b1 to b3 are
positive.
To test the hypothesizedmoderation relationships
(Hypotheses 1b, 2b and 3b) we allow b1 to b3 to vary
systematically based on whether the focal guidance
represents a projected increase in earnings. This is
represented by the following equation:
7 While this suggests that most of the estimates in our
dataset are close to the end of the fiscal year, this is not the
case since many firms do issue estimates early in the fiscal
year. The average time between an estimate and the end of
the fiscal year in our dataset is 116 days.
8 Clustered errors rely on less assumption about the
structure of our data than do fixed effects. Fixed effects
assume a particular structure of the error components:
While every observation across the groups (firms and year)
is assumed to be uncorrelated, every observation within
each group is assumed to be equally well correlated to all
other observations within that group. Clustered errors also
make the first assumption but allow for flexibility of the
structure within group correlations. Thus, the use of clus-
tered errors leads to more robust results (e.g., Andrews,
1991; Cameron & Miller, 2011; Rogers, 1993; Thompson,
2011, Petersen, 2009, Williams, 2000; Wooldridge, 2010).
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Preci 5b0 1b1EMi 1b12UPi 3EMi 1b2BIP
1b22UPi 3BIPi 1b3NMAi
1b32UPi 3NMAi 1 gCV 1 «i (2)
In this model, the primary null hypotheses of in-
terest are that the coefficient estimates, b12, b22, and
b23, equal zero, which would indicate that the effect
of earnings misses, below-industry-average perfor-
mance, and negative reactions to M&A announce-
ments on guidance precisions is not moderated by
whether the focal guidance represents a projected
increase in earnings, while Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and
3b imply that b12 . 0, b22 . 0 and b32 . 0.
Measures used in the Probit Regression
The dependent variable in the Probit model is
whether a firm issued earnings guidance in a specific
year. The independent variables for this model are
based on findings from the accounting literature.
Prior forecasting behavior. We capture whether
a firm issues earnings guidance in the prior yearwith
a dummyvariablewith a value of 1 if it did so. Survey
evidence from Graham et al. (2005), for instance, has
shown that managers issue earnings guidance to
develop and maintain a reputation for transparency,
and thus, strategic leaders that issued prior guidance
are more likely to engage in future guidance.
Information asymmetry. Firms that issue guid-
ancemaydo so because outsiders lack information to
make informed decisions about firm earnings—such
information asymmetry increases the demand by
analysts and potential investors for earnings guid-
ance (Ajinkya & Gift, 1984; Verrecchia, 2001). Low-
ering information asymmetry may be desirable to
managers because it is associated with higher li-
quidity (Diamond&Verrecchia, 1991) and lower cost
of capital (Leuz & Verrechia, 2000). We follow the
accounting literature (e.g., Coller & Yohn, 1997) and
measure information asymmetry as the bid–ask
spread of a company’s stock price (averaged by fiscal
year). We also include firm size (the log of the total
assets) as another measure of information asymme-
tries since larger firms are usually more closely
scrutinized by the market compared smaller ones,
which results in less information asymmetry (e.g.,
Aggarwal, Krigman, & Womack, 2002). We also in-
clude the number of analysts covering a firm in
a given year as a measure of how much information
about a firm is available.
Managerial incentives. More frequent guidance
can reduce equity mispricing, and, as a result, firms
that are managed by CEOs with greater levels of
equity-based compensation may issue guidance
more frequently. Perhaps this is most obvious for
guidance that is perceived to contain good news.
Equally, however, the absence of guidance may be
interpreted negatively. For example, when Merck
CEO Kenneth Frazier revealed that the firm would
discontinue earnings guidance, sell-side analysts
called the choice “disingenuous” and “befuddling,”
and Merck stock fell 3% based on the news. To
control for this, we include performance-based CEO
compensation as a control variable, representing
nonsalary CEO remuneration that is tied to company
performance (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006).
Year and industry.We include year and industry
(based on the Standard Industrial Classification
system at the 3 digit level [SIC 3D]) dummies in the
estimation procedures because firms’ tendency to
issue guidance changes over time and might differ
between industries (e.g., Graham et al., 2005).
Dependent Variables Used in the Second Set of
Regressions
The dependent variable for the first set of hy-
potheses is the precision of firms’ annual earnings
guidance. We measure precision as the range in
which guidance is expressed (in cents). Because this
range will depend in part on the size of the guidance
(a 4-cent range for a 5-cent-per-sharemidpoint is less
precise than a 4-cent range for a 50-cent-per-share
midpoint), we combine this dependent variablewith
a control variable for the midpoint of the guidance
range. Larger guidance ranges represent lower pre-
cision. Therefore, to facilitate interpretation of co-
efficients (i.e., higher coefficients connote higher
precision), we create our measurement of precision
by multiplying this variable by –1.
As the dependent variable for Hypothesis 4, we
use the cumulative abnormal market adjusted
returns of a firm’s share price based on a window of
one day before the announcement until one day after
the announcement, along the lines of prior studies in
finance and management (Hayward & Hambrick,
1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). We calculate the
expected return (inpercent) basedonamarketmodel
that assumes a stable linear relation between the
market return (value weighted, based on CRSP) and
return of the shares of the focal firm. The window in
which the market model is estimated is one year,
ending a week before the earnings guidance an-
nouncement, helping to ensure that the estimation
window is not unduly influenced by premature
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release of information. To ensure that we are only
capturing the effect of guidance announcements, we
use theRavenPackdataset of companypress releases
and announcements to exclude all observations for
which confounding other announcements were
made during the announcement window. This re-
sults in 541 observations being excluded from the
analysis.
Independent Variables Used in the Second
Set of Regressions
Prior year’s earnings miss. This variable mea-
sures whether a firmmissed its earnings guidance in
the prior year, coded 1 if the guidance was missed
and 0 otherwise.
Below-industry-average market performance.
This variable captures whether a firm under-
performed its industry peers (based on three-digit
SIC) in the quarter before earnings guidance was
given, coded 1 if a firm was underperforming and
0 otherwise. This choice of measure follows evi-
dence that professional investors examine the per-
formance of focal firms in an industry relative to
peers when arriving at expected returns that cover
the cost of capital of investing in the industry
(e.g., Fama & French, 1997), and that security ana-
lysts are usually assigned to industry groups (Barber,
Lehavy, McNichols, & Trueman, 2001).
Negative reaction to an M&A. This measures
whether there was a negative reaction (abnormal
return, see above) to an M&A announcement made
by the focal firm in the quarter before the focal
earnings guidance (if no M&A announcement was
made, the variable is set to 0).
Upward guidance. This measures the degree (as
a proportion) to which the focal guidance is higher
than the previous year’s EPS.
Control Variables Used in the Second Set of
Regressions
We incorporate a variety of additional control
variables in the OLS procedure. As described above,
we include the midpoint of the focal guidance to
control for smaller guidance ranges around lower
midpoints. Based on the two-stage regressionmodel,
we also include the inverse Mills ratio from the
Probit regression to control for the selection bias
(Heckman, 1979; Winship & Mare, 1992). We also
include the time in days between the earnings guid-
ance and the end of the fiscal year as a control vari-
able, assuming that guidance becomesmore accurate
and potentially more precise the closer it is to the
end of the financial period.
The precision of earnings guidance might result
from stable firm practices. We seek to capture such
relatively time invariant processes through clustered
errors (e.g., Andrews, 1991; Cameron and Miller,
2011; Petersen, 2009; Rogers, 1993; Thompson, 2011;
Williams, 2000,Wooldridge, 2010).However,wealso
control for time-variant changes in such practices by
including the average precision with which forecasts
were announced the year prior to the focal year as
a control.
Another factor that can influence guidance pre-
cision involves the uncertainty faced by the focal
firm–more uncertainty increases the difficulty of
being more precise (Ajinkya & Gift, 1984; Baginski &
Hassell, 1997; Baginski, Hassell, & Kimbrough,
2004). We seek to use control variables to reflect
this uncertainty, starting with the average precision
used by all firms in a focal firm’s industry in every
year (based on three-digit SIC codes), which is an
indicator of industry patterns of earnings guidance
precision, as well as of the general uncertainty faced
by an industry. We also include a measure of firm-
specific risk in our analysis. We calculate the co-
efficient of share price variation as a riskmeasure for
each company in our dataset by dividing the yearly
variance of a company’s share price (adjusted for
splits) by the average yearly share price of that
company (Brown, Hillegeist, & Lo, 2005; Field,
Lowry, & Shu, 2005; Rogers & Stocken, 2005).
In a similar vein, we control for the number of
forecasts a firm makes in each fiscal year in light of
the variation in the frequency of guidance updates
and the prospect that more frequent guidance is a
sign of changing conditions or uncertainty.
We also include control variables for a firm’s abi-
lity to engage in earnings management. Healy and
Wahlen (1999: 368) described earningsmanagement
as “judgment in financial reporting and in structur-
ing transactions to alter financial reports to mislead
some stakeholders about the underlying economic
performance of the company.” It follows that firms
with greater ability to make such a judgment will be
better able to attain earnings targets, which canmake
it easier for them to release more precise guidance.
To control for this effect, we include a variety of
measures shown to influence firms’ ability to man-
age earnings. First, we control for firm size by in-
cluding the natural log of a firm’s assets, since larger
firms tend to have a greater ability to manage their
earnings (Hall & Weiss, 1967). Second, because de-
preciation charges involve a substantial amount of
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judgment, we use the reported amount of de-
preciation and amortization in a given year as
a control (Beaver, McNichols, & Rhie, 2005). Third,
earnings manipulation often occurs through dis-
cretionary accruals involving accounting treat-
ments of balance sheet items in accrual-based
accounting. Thus, we include current assets (in-
cluding accounts receivable and inventory hold-
ings) and current liabilities as control variables
(Barton & Simko, 2002; see Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008;
Oyer, 1998; Roychowdhury, 2006).
Finally, we control for the effect of extraordinary
items, an accounting category that consists of one-
time expenses and noncash charges, including items
such as goodwill fromM&As, restructuring reserves,
and losses from assets that have been adversely
marked to market. There is evidence that analysts
pay less attention to such nonrecurring charges be-
cause they are typically unrelated to a firm’s ongoing
operations (Bernstein & Siegel, 1979; Bradshaw &
Sloan, 2002; DeGeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999).
Because the treatment, timing, and magnitude of
these items is at least somewhat discretionary, firm-
to-firm practices pertaining to extraordinary items
have the potential to be highly heterogeneous. Firms
who have the ability to account for extraordinary
items in a given year might be able to manage their
earnings, and thus can issue more precise earnings,
making it useful to control for them (Bernstein &
Siegel, 1979; Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; DeGeorge
et al., 1999).
In a similar vein, the interpretation of favorable
earnings guidancemay be influenced by self-serving
practices by CEOs, who may be motivated to ma-
nipulate earnings numbers to obtain higher com-
pensation. In fact, the earnings guidance literature
has suggested that variable compensation is a very
significant predictor of whether strategic leaders
engage in earnings management. For instance,
Cheng and Warfield (2005) reported that over
the 1993–2000 timeframe, strategic leaders with
higher stock-based compensation that was heavily
influenced by earnings performance were more
likely to engage in earnings management. Simi-
larly, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006: 511) re-
ported that “the use of discretionary accruals to
manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced
at firms where the CEO’s potential total compen-
sation is more closely tied to the value of stock and
option holdings,” in other words, where the value
of such stock is closely tied to earnings performance.
Accordingly, we include the amount of variable
(performance-based) CEO compensation as a control
variable, representing nonsalary CEO remuneration
that is tied to company performance (Bergstresser &
Philippon, 2006).
As in the Probit model, we include a measure of
information asymmetry—the bid–ask spread aver-
age of a company’s stock price in the fiscal year in
which the guidance is issued (Ajinkya & Gift, 1984;
Verrecchia, 2001). We also include the number of
analysts covering a firm in the focal year, since
a larger analyst following will reduce information
asymmetry (Aggarwal, Krigman, & Womack (2002).
As argued above, information asymmetry leads an-
alysts and potential investors to seek additional
earnings guidance (Ajinkya & Gift, 1984; Verrecchia,
2001), andperhapsmore precise guidance is ameans
of reducing such information asymmetry.
The precision with which earnings forecasts are
issued could also be influenced by managers’ confi-
dence in their ability to make precise forecasts. With
a stronger history of accurate guidance, such man-
agers may be more confident in this ability (e.g.,
Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Hayward & Hambrick,
1997). To exclude this alternative explanation for
more precise guidance, we employ an additional
control variable. We examine the history of accuracy
of a firm’s earnings guidance activities in the last two
years, which we measure as the percentage of accu-
rate annual and quarterly guidance. We determine
guidance to be accuratewhen real earningsmatch the
midpoint of the guidance range; by defining accuracy
in this way, our measure is independent of the pre-
cision with which past guidance was issued on the
basis that being accurate within a wider range will
instill less confidence. (We also include ameasure for
posthoc accuracyof forecasts ina sensitivity analysis,
see below.)
Lastly, we control for the firm’s PE ratio (based on
the projected earnings). Higher PE ratios imply
growth potential relative to current earnings. As an
indication of the firm’s future potential, including
a PE variable allows us to control for the extent to
which growth expectations may discount the im-
portance of focal earnings guidance (Fama, 1991).
RESULTS
The average precision in our sample is 28.01—
this means that the average range surrounding
guidance is 8.01 cents (as describe above, we multi-
ply the range by 21 to ease interpretation of our
results, so that larger numbers indicate more pre-
cision). In our sample, precision is positively corre-
lated to an earnings miss in the prior year (p, 0.05),
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to a negative market reaction to an M&A announce-
ment (p , 0.05), and to performing below industry
average before the guidance (p, 0.05). The full set of
descriptive statistics and first-order correlations can
be found in Table 1.
As explained above, we can only examine the an-
tecedents of earnings precision for firms that choose
to issue guidance, and we correct for this selection
bias when we test our hypotheses, using a Heckman
two-staged procedure.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the first step of
this procedure. As described above, our combined
dataset contains all firms covered in the First Call
database for which Compustat and CRSP data were
available. However, the firms covered in the First
Call database do not necessarily issue earnings
guidance every year. Thus, our dataset contains
19,424 firm-year observations, while, on average,
firms issue guidance in only 38% of the years.
However, we find that more firms issue guidance in
the early years of our sample (e.g., 40% in 2005) than
in the later years (e.g., 34% in 2011).
The first step of this analysis addresses the ques-
tion of what influences whether a firm issues earn-
ings guidance in a given year. To examine this
question, we conduct a Probit regression containing,
as independent variables, factors that have been
found in past studies to influence a firm’s propensity
to issue earnings guidance (Heckman, 1979;Winship
&Mare, 1992). Table 2 summarizes the results of this
analysis. The results indicate that the level of in-
formation asymmetry (p , 0.001), the size of the
firm’s CEOs variable compensation (p , 0.001), as
well as the fact that a firm issued guidance in the
prior year (p, 0.001) all increase the probability that
firms will issue guidance in the focal year.
The second step of the Heckman procedure is
summarized in Table 3. It tests Hypotheses 1a
through 3a. Model 0 examines the effect of only the
control variables on guidance precision. We find
significant negative coefficients for the absolute
value of the guidancemidpoint (p, 0.001), whether
the guidance represents an upward guidance
(p , 0.05), the time between the guidance and the
end of the year (p , 0.001), as well as a firm’s total
assets (log) (p , 0.001). Significant positive co-
efficients are found for the number of forecasts
(p,0.01), the averageprecisionwithwhichguidance
was issued in the previous fiscal year (p , 0.001),
current assets (p , 0.001), CEOs’ variable compen-
sation (p,0.01), numberof analysts covering the firm
(p , 0.001), the PE ratio (p , 0.05), and the inverse
Mills ratio (p, 0.01).
Model 1 tests Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a, wherein
the coefficient for “previous year earnings miss,”
“negative performance relative to industry,” and
“negative reaction to M&A announcements” are all
significant and positive. The results are thus con-
sistent with the OIM perspective embedded in Hy-
potheses 1a, 2a and 3a. In Model 2, we test whether
this direct relationship is moderated by whether the
focal guidance represents a projected increase in
earnings (upward guidance). The coefficient for up-
ward guidance is negative and significant (p, 0.05),
which indicates that upward guidance is on average
issued with less precision (perhaps this is driven by
caution, to reduce the risk of beingwrong). However,
the interaction between “previous year’s earnings
miss” and upward guidance is significant and posi-
tive, lending support to Hypothesis 1a: after an
earnings miss, upward guidance is issued with more
precision than upward guidance that does not follow
an earnings miss. The interaction between “negative
reaction to M&As” and upward guidance is also
significant and positive, lending support to Hy-
pothesis 3b. However, the interaction between
“below-industry-average performance” and upward
guidance is not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 2b is
not supported.
The results of the analysis to test Hypothesis 4 are
presented in Table 4.
This analysis is based on standard event study, as
discussed earlier. The key independent variable in
this analysis is the precision of the focal guidance.
We use the same controls as before, but adding our
upward guidance measure, as discussed in the
measures section, to control for whether the guid-
ance represents good (or bad) news in relation to the
previous guidance. We follow most event studies
and do not use standardized coefficients, since the
dependent variable is market reaction in percent—a
variable that can be easy interpreted and compared
to similar studies (see the discussion section below).
As Table 4 indicates, precision has a positive effect
on a firm’s abnormal return (p , 0.05), lending sup-
port to Hypothesis 4.
Sensitivity Analyses and Robustness Tests
Industry measurement. In our main analysis, we
use three-digit SIC codes to identify a firm’s industry
membership. To check whether our results are ro-
bust across different industry specifications, we also
conduct our analysis using two-digit SIC codes. Do-
ing so yields similar results to those reported above
for coefficients of interest.
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Time between earnings guidance and end of
fiscal year. In our main analysis, we choose the last
earnings guidance a firm provides before the last
month of the fiscal year. As a check of whether our
results are driven by this choice, we also estimate the
complete model using the last guidance before the
last quarter of the fiscal year. Coefficients of interest
remain significant, with the same sign as those in the
main analysis.
As discussed above, some firms issue guidance
more than once in a fiscal year. We therefore also in-
clude a sensitivity analysis where we use the cumu-
lative precision of all guidance issued after our events
of interest, but before 30 days before the end of the
fiscal year. The two events for which we can do this
are “after an earnings miss” and “after a negative re-
action toanM&Aannouncement.”Wecannotuse this
cumulative approach for “below-industry-average
performance,” because there we look at a firm’s per-
formance relative to its industry in the quarter before
individual guidance was issued. Results from these
analyses do not change the significance of the co-
efficients of interest.
TABLE 2
Probit Regression, Probability Modeled for Firm Issuing
Earnings Guidance in a Given Year
Intercept 1.57 (9.95)
Information asymmetry 0.28*** (0.05)
Number of analysts following 0.00 (0.01)
Assets (log) 0.00 (0.00)
Performance-based CEO compensation 0.01*** (0.00)
Guidance issued in previous year 0.60*** (0.05)
Pseudo R-squared 0.20
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; year and industry
dummies are not shown; n 5 19,424.
* p , .05
** p , .01
***p , .001
TABLE 3
Results of OLS Regression Analysis in Predicting Earnings Precision
Model 0 (controls only) Model 1 (direct effects) Model 2 (interactions)
Previous year earnings miss 0.30** (0.11) 0.30** (0.11)
Return below industry average 0.20* (0.10) 0.21*(0.10)
Negative M&A announcement return 0.42*** (0.12) 0.43*** (0.11)
Upward guidance * previous year earnings miss 0.64** (0.19)
Upward guidance * Return below industry return 0.31 (0.26)
Upward guidance * negative M&A announcement
return
0.54* (0.25)
Upward guidance 20.58* (0.21) 20.52* (0.21) 20.51* (0.21)
Guidance midpoint 23.19*** (0.57) 23.29*** (0.58) 23.42*** (0.58)
Firm risk 0.13 (0.10) 0.13 (0.10) 0.15 (0.10)
Time until fiscal year end 20.98*** (0.14) 20.92*** (0.14) 20.88*** (0.14)
Industry precision 0.54 (0.30) 0.54 (0.30) 0.53 (0.30)
Number of forecasts 0.41** (0.13) 0.40** (0.13) 0.40** (0.13)
Previous year precision 1.54*** (0.20) 1.52*** (0.20) 1.50*** (0.19)
Total assets (log) 21.35*** (0.22) 21.33*** (0.22) 21.21*** (0.22)
Depreciation and amortization 20.70 (0.39) 20.63 (0.38) 20.61 (0.38)
Current assets 0.95*** (0.28) 0.94*** (0.28) 0.90*** (0.27)
Current liabilities 0.09 (0.26) 20.01 (0.25) 20.02 (0.26)
Extraordinary items 20.03 (0.05) 20.03 (0.04) 20.03 (0.04)
Leverage 0.05 (0.14) 0.05 (0.14) 0.04 (0.14)
Information asymmetry 20.57 (0.30) 20.60* (0.30) 20.61* (0.31)
Performance-based CEO compensation 0.48** (0.16) 0.46** (0.16) 0.47** (0.15)
Number of analysts following 0.68*** (0.12) 0.67*** (0.12) 0.63*** (0.12)
Past accuracy 0.10 (0.12) 0.10 (0.12) 0.12 (0.12)
Price earnings ratio 0.26* (0.11) 0.25* (0.11) 0.23* (0.10)
Inverse Mills ratio from probit regression 0.72** (0.23) 0.72** (0.23) 0.70** (0.23)
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.24
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Managers’ confidence in their forecasting
ability. As we elaborated above, managers that are
more confident in their ability to forecast future
earnings might issue guidance with more precision.
Our context limits this effect to some degree, since
the organizational setbacks we study should in fact
reduce such confidence. In addition, we control for
managers’ confidence in their forecasting ability in
our main analysis. However, this control is based on
historical performance. As a sensitivity analysis, we
add an additional control: A measure of ex post ac-
curacy to account for guidance accuracy in the focal
year as the absolute value of the distance between the
guidance midpoint and the firm’s actual earnings as
a percentage of the guidancemidpoint. Thismeasure
captures managers’ forecasting ability, which can be
a measure of their ex ante confidence if we assume
that leaders have some degree of understanding of
their forecasting abilities. Doing so leads to similar
results as those reported above (the measure of focal
year guidance error itself has a negative and signifi-
cant [p , 0.001] coefficient, suggesting that firms
with larger guidance errors issue less precise guid-
ance). This further indicates that the results of in-
terest are not driven by managers’ confidence about
their guidance abilities.
Estimation method. In our main analysis, we es-
timate our models with the use of clustered errors.
We also conduct an analysis using fixed firm and
year effects. Doing so results in similar coefficient
sizes and significance as those in our main analysis.
Event window. To test Hypothesis 4, in our main
analysis we use a short event window to reduce the
noise in our measurement, since information other
than announcements of earnings guidance might be
released in larger windows, making it harder to
capture the effect of the guidance announcement on
a firm’s stock market performance. However, in-
formation about an upcoming announcement might
leak before the actual announcement itself—a fact
that justifies the use of a largerwindow.We therefore
also conduct a set of sensitivity analyses using three,
four, five, and six days before the announcement as
the start of the event window; in all these analyses,
precision remains a significant and positive pre-
dictor of the cumulative abnormal return.
Controlling for downside risk as predicted by
a given forecast. A narrower range in earnings
guidance could be perceived as a sign of lower
downside risk in actual earnings. A larger range
suggests that the actual earnings could be lower (or
higher) than for a narrower range (e.g., 5 to 15 cents
vs. 9 to 11 cents). The market may react positively to
a narrower range because it implies less downside
risk. In our main analysis, to test Hypothesis 4, we
control for themidpoint of the guidance.We conduct
an additional sensitivity analysis in which we re-
place this control with the lowest point of the guid-
ance,which represents the lowest possible value that
a firm predicts the earnings to be. Doing so leads to
similar results as found in our main analysis (pre-
cision remains a significant predictor of the abnor-
mal return surrounding a guidance announcement).
Direction of guidance. As suggested, more pre-
cise forecasts can be motivated by an interest to be
more persuasive, andbyOIMmotivations. Could our
result that precision has a positive effect on a firm’s
share price be driven by persuasion? Past studies
TABLE 4
The Effect of Precision on a Firm’s Abnormal Returns on










0.044 (0.049) 0.054 (0.053)
Guidance midpoint 20.004** (0.002) 20.003* (0.002)
Firm risk 0.012 (0.026) 0.006 (0.026)
Time until fiscal year
end
20.002 (0.002) 20.002 (0.002)
Industry precision 0.013 (0.018) 0.004 (0.018)
Number of forecasts 0.074 (0.079) 0.061 (0.081)
Previous year precision 20.005 (0.018) 20.013 (0.018)
Total assets (log) 0.386** (0.132) 0.435** (0.134)
Depreciation and
amortization
0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Current assets 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Current liabilities 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Extraordinary items 0.002 (0.006) 0.003 (0.006)
Leverage 20.008 (0.008) 20.008 (0.008)
Information asymmetry 0.839* (0.348) 0.827* (0.349)
Performance-based
CEO compensation
0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Number of analysts
following
20.007 (0.023) 20.017 (0.024)
Past accuracy 0.225 (0.219) 0.204 (0.220)
Price earnings ratio 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
Inverse Mills ratio from
probit regression
20.590* (0.287) 20.802* (0.304)
R-square 0.02 0.03
Notes: Since market movements of the course of one day are
relatively small we present the coefficients with three digits.
Standard errors in parentheses; n 5 4187.
*p , .05
**p , .01
*** p , .001
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have indicated that upward guidance—that is,
guidance that represents an increase over past
guidance—has a positive effect on a firm’s share
price, while downward guidance has a negative ef-
fect (Anilowski et al., 2007; Atiase, Li, Supattarakul,
& Tse, 2005; Kasznik & McNichols, 2002). If pre-
cision is more persuasive, then precision will have
apositive effect on shareprices for upward guidance,
but a negative effect for downward guidance (it
wouldpersuade themarket that theup- ordownward
guidance is realistic). However, if precision creates
generalized positive impressions about a firm and its
leaders (as we suggest), then that effect should be
independent of the direction of the guidance.
While we control for the direction of the guidance
in our analysis, we seek to examine this matter fur-
ther. To do so, we split our sample into two sub-
samples. One contains all observations in which the
focal guidance represents upward guidance, and one
has all observations that represent downward guid-
ance. In both subsamples, precision has the same
positive effect (although in both samples the effect of
precision is only significant at p , 0.071). This pro-
vides additional evidence that precision has a posi-
tive effect on the share price independent of the
direction of the guidance—precision seems to create
overall positive impressions.
DISCUSSION
We presented three sets of results that support the
proposed theoretical framework linking OIM to
forecast precision. The first set of results suggests
that forecast precision can result from three distinct
antecedents of OIM: earnings guidance misses,
earnings that are below industry average, and poorly
received M&As. These results underscore general
antecedent conditions that prompt firm leaders to
convey a greater sense of control through more pre-
cise forecasts. The effect sizeswe find in this analysis
are quite substantial; after an earnings miss, pre-
cision increases by 0.3 standard deviation points,
which represents an overall increase of 2.9 cents (the
average precision is an 8 cent spread). After a period
with below-industry-average returns, precision in-
creases by 1.9 cents, and after a negative reaction to
anM&Aannouncement it goes up by 4 cents—a 50%
increase from the average level of precision. The
second set of results shows that in this context,
forecast precision is more pronounced when firm
leaders seek to convey brighter organizational pros-
pects, indicating that the need to communicate
control is evenmore pronouncedwhen stakeholders
are asked to accept upward guidance. The third set
shows that forecast precision has a direct effect on
a firm’s share pricemovement on the day the forecast
is announced, which indicates that the market
values the sense of control that more precise guid-
ance suggests.
Contributions to OIM Theory
First, we introduced precision as an OIM tactic,
which could be used not just by strategic leaders but
also by salespeople and other organizational fore-
casters. Elsbach (2003) showed that leaders use ver-
bal accounts, category labels, symbolic behaviors,
and physical markers to respond to a variety of
threats: identity, image, and reputation. These ap-
proaches, while varying in their respective foci,
highlight that impression managers are often moti-
vated to recover social support either because their
organizations’ legitimacy is threatened or weak
(e.g., Elsbach & Kramer, 1996), or because their or-
ganizations have adopted a controversial policy or
received a negative appraisal (e.g., Westphal &
Graebner, 2010).
Complementing these prior studies, we examined
an ongoing manifestation of the management of
stakeholder perceptions regarding firms’ perfor-
mance by analyzing how leaders use quantitative
guidance to shape performance perceptions. As
discussed, we observe a tendency in the organiza-
tional impression management literature to address
either qualitative responses to deficits in organiza-
tional performance (e.g., verbal accounts) or certain
kinds of compensatory organizational initiatives
(e.g., making changes to a board of directors, in-
tervening with journalists and security analysts).
However, it is common, and perhaps even necessary
sometimes, for strategic leaders to also offer more
precise framing of guidance as a means of shaping
performance expectations. For instance, during the
global financial crisis of 2008, bank leaders sought
to assure investors that their firms were solvent by
making increasingly precise representations about
the adequacy of their capital reserves (Chami,
Hakura, Cosimano, & Barajas, 2010; Lapavitsas,
2009).
Kahneman (2011) concluded that humans adopt
twomodes of thinking: Type 1 thinking involves fast,
intuitive, unconscious thought, while Type 2 think-
ing is based on slow, calculating, conscious thought.
We suggest that much of the OIM literature is pred-
icated onType 2 thinking; however, Type 1would be
effective as an OIM tactic because the fast, intuitive,
1110 JuneAcademy of Management Journal
and subconscious reactions it involves (Kahneman,
2011) could reduce the likelihood that target audi-
ences would raise questions about strategic leaders’
motivations. There is strong evidence from psy-
chology studies that precision operates as a Type 1
process (e.g., Jerez-Fernandez et al., 2014; Mason
et al., 2013). We therefore suggest that other tactics
that invoke Type 1 processes—grounded in the lit-
erature on heuristics and biases—are also worthy
avenues for further OIM research.
In addition to contributing to OIM theory, this
paper adds a fresh perspective to existing accounting
explanations of earnings guidance precision by po-
sitioning OIM explanations of more precise judg-
ment relative to other explanations. Hypotheses
based on uncertainty or accuracy theory tend to ex-
amine the level of uncertainty in earnings guidance
when the guidance is made in order to predict fore-
cast precision (e.g., Choi, Myers, Zang, & Ziebart,
2010). In addition, “managerial confidence” theory
predicts that managers whose earnings are more
predictable and managers who have more confi-
dence in their ability to predict earnings tend to be
more precise. We extensively controlled for these
aspects, yet our coefficients of interest were signif-
icant even with these controls. Our context also
limits confidence as an explanation, sincemanagers
will be more likely to be less confident after any of
the negative eventswe examined.Thus by imposing
conditions of organizational setbacks, our study
indicates that OIM plays a role in precision.
On the surface, the presented results might seem
surprising: When managers have experienced an
organizational setback, they could be expected to
exercise greater care in forecast accuracy. However,
the results presented here are consistent with the
OIM-based theory developed earlier—the motiva-
tion to establish or reestablish greater authority with
stakeholders is salient and instrumental after orga-
nizational setbacks. The results are also consistent
with the evidence of widespread errors in earnings
guidance, and evidence of managerial short-
termism, wherein the motivation to be seen as be-
ing in control could trump that of being accurate. An
unresolved question that is beyond the scope of this
article is whether more precise judgment ultimately
“catches up” with top mangers in the sense that in-
vestors lose confidence and faith in top managers
who miss targets.
Second, there is strong support from our estima-
tionprocedures thatmanagerial attempts to establish
a greater senseof control are strongerwhenmanagers
forecast a brighter future (when they issue upward
guidance) after organizational setbacks. In fact, our
results indicate that managers are careful when they
issue upward guidance; on average, they do so with
less precision in order to reduce the risk of being
wrong. However, when they forecast a rosier picture
after setbacks, they do so with more precision. Such
setbacks foster negative impressions, after which the
prediction of higher earnings invokes even greater
cognitive dissonance. Therefore, in this context
managers would be even more motivated to over-
come skepticism by using more precise forecasts to
strengthen impressions that they control firm strat-
egy and performance. We note, however that these
results were sensitive to the type of organizational
setback, with previous years’ earnings miss and
negative M&A announcement returns implicating
the effect strongly.
Third, we provide evidence regarding the efficacy
of forecast precision as an OIM tactic, underscoring
managers’ rationale for being more precise. In fact,
this effect of precision of a firm’s share price is quite
substantial. The average precision of earnings fore-
casts is 8 cents. Our analysis indicates that an in-
crease in precision of 1 cent results in an abnormal
return on the day the guidance is announced of about
0.06%. Thus, an increase from the average precision
to themaximumpossible precision (a range of 0) will
result in an abnormal return of about half a percent
(0.48%). Given that the average market capitaliza-
tion in our sample is $1.9 billion, this suggests that if
firms with an average market cap announce their
earnings guidancewithmaximumprecision, instead
of with average precision, they will increase their
market value on the announcement day by $9.18
million. Our analysis also suggests that this result is
not simply attributable to precision being more per-
suasive, insofar as the results are independent of
whether the guidance represents good or bad news
(up- or downward guidance).
Generalizability to Other Domains of
Managerial Precision
Theory and evidence has suggested that managers
are motivated to be precise to manage impressions
of stakeholders in the crucial domain of earnings
guidance, and there is every reason to believe that
precision would be used as an impression manage-
ment tactic well beyond this domain. We argue that
precision creates the impression that a forecaster is
authoritative and in control—an impression that
would be desirable in a variety of situations. In an
organizational setting, any prediction of the impact
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of a planned strategy or action can be expressedwith
varying levels of precision and the theory presented
here suggests that the more motivated the forecaster
is to be perceived as authoritative and in control, the
greater theprecision theywill use. In turn, this points
to testable relationships, including that prospective
outcomes of more challenging strategic initiatives,
such as M&As or new market entries or business
plans in entrepreneurial settings, would be framed
with a high level of precision.
Similarly, salespeople might use precision to gain
authority with, and overcome skepticism of, new cus-
tomers. By contrast, they would be predicted to be less
precise in representations toexistingandmoresatisfied
customers, where credibility is already established. In
the context of new products, companies would tend to
make strong and precise representations about defect
rates or performance because of their managers’ bias
toward stronger impression management. The same
mechanisms would be manifested outside the organi-
zational context, including when politicians forecast
the costs of policies or actions and their likely out-
comes. Finally, the theorydevelopedhere also suggests
that researchers across scholarly disciplines might use
moreprecision than justifiedwhen theypresent results
or when they discuss implications of their work in an
attempt to convey that they are authoritative in the
subject matter. In each case, the theory here suggests
that the use of precision may have favorable effects
on audiences and stakeholders, but the longer-term
implications of such judgment remains an important
avenue for scholarly inquiry.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Limitations of this study include the prospect that
other factors impact stakeholder responses to earn-
ings releases, including qualitative statements about
earnings guidance. We recognize that management
statements that accompany earnings guidance—such
as additional explanation of the numbers, verbal
statements about the firm’s prospects, and strategic
intent—are also used to augment the precision of the
estimate. The manner and the effectiveness with
which quantitative and verbal representations are
used in tandem remains a fruitful area of research.
Similar to prior research on OIM, we have not di-
rectly observed CEO or CFO intentions through, say,
survey instruments (see Graffin, Haleblian, & Kiley,
2015, for an approach that is related to ours), al-
though the setbacks that implicate OIM have been
substantiated through survey data in other research
(e.g.,Westphal et al., 2012). Overall, then,wepresent
a robust pattern of results wherein each adverse or-
ganizational development positively affects pre-
cision for subsequent guidance. Likewise,we did not
observe the time taken for investors and analysts to
cognitively process precise earnings guidance; in-
stead, we rely on evidence from the psychology lit-
erature to account for these processes.
The study also has limitations with respect to the
scope of research questions asked. Other aspects of
guidance precision remain important, including fac-
tors that explain when managers’ credibility is suffi-
ciently impaired that any forecasts are unpersuasive.
Various questions emerge for future research. For in-
stance, have professional investors become more
sophisticated over time in learning about and inter-
preting the level of precision in guidance? Moreover,
what are the costs to managers of issuing precise
forecastswitha level ofprecision that isnotwarranted
by the underlying uncertainty of their firms? Past re-
search has suggested that managers often fail to de-
liver on their forecasts. While our results, to some
degree, help to explain this finding, questions about
the consequences of such failures, including any
fallout from stakeholders that affects theirwillingness
to trust subsequent forecasts, remain. Could it be that
earnings guidanceprecision is a precursor to earnings
management thathas beenassociatedwith fraudulent
earnings reporting?
As abrief conclusion,weremain intriguedby (a) the
further potential to investigate the antecedents, na-
ture, and implications of precision as an impression
management tactic in otherdomains of organizational
inquiry, and (b) the scope for other kinds of numerical
representations to serve as a powerful OIM tactic.
Whether for scholars who make claims about the
significance of coefficients or managers who make
representations about prospective earnings, the mo-
tivation and consequences of using a high level of
precision in judgments warrants closer investigation.
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